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Abstract
Background: The World Trade Organisation's Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (known as the Doha Declaration) of 2001, and subsequent Decision on the Interpretation
of Paragraph 6 reached in 2003, affirmed the flexibilities available under the Agreement on Trade
Related Property Rights (TRIPS) to member states seeking to protect public health. Despite these
important clarifications, the actual implementation of these measures to improve access to
medicines remains uncertain. There are also concerns that so-called TRIPS-plus measures within
many regional and bilateral trade agreements are further undermining the capacity of the poor to
access affordable medicines.
Methods: The paper reviews policy debates among governments, nongovernmental organisations
and international organisations from 1995, and notably since 2003, surrounding access to medicines
and trade agreements. The provisions for protecting public health provided by the Doha
Declaration and Paragraph 6 Decision are reviewed in terms of challenges for implementation,
along with measures to protect intellectual property rights (IPRs) under selected regional and
bilateral trade agreements.
Results:  While provisions, in principle, were affirmed for member states under the TRIPS
agreement to protect public health, numerous challenges remain. Implementation of the flexibilities
has been hindered by lack of capacity in many LMICs. More intransigent have been stark inequalities
in power and influence among trading nations, leaving LMICs vulnerable to pressures to permit the
globalization of IPRs in order to protect broader trade and economic interests. Such inequalities
are apparent in proposals or adopted TRIPS-plus measures which re-establish the primacy of trade
over public health goals.
Conclusion: Despite being hailed as a "watershed in international trade", the Doha Declaration
and Paragraph 6 decision have not resolved the problem of access to affordable medicines. The way
forward must begin with a simplification of their content, to enable actual implementation. More
fundamentally, once agreed, public health protections under TRIPS must be recognised as taking
precedent over measures subsequently adopted under other trade agreements. This requires,
above all, setting aside such protections as a basic need and shared goal from trade negotiations at
all levels.
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Background
The issue of access to medicines remains at a crossroad
between the ongoing globalisation of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs), and significant demand for drugs to
meet critical public health needs among the world's poor.
Campaigning by the governments of many low and mid-
dle-income countries (LMICs), alongside nongovernmen-
tal organisations (NGOs), has centred on the potential for
trade agreements, notably the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), to
hinder the availability of affordable medicines. In 2001
the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (known as the Doha Declaration), affirmed the
right of member states of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) to interpret and implement TRIPS in a manner
supporting the protection of public health and, in partic-
ular, access to medicines [1]. While initially well-received,
consternation soon arose over interpretation of a specific
paragraph of the Doha Declaration on compulsory licens-
ing [2]. After two years of further deliberation, the WTO
Decision on the Interpretation of Paragraph 6 was
announced in 2003 specifying when countries can import
drugs produced elsewhere under compulsory licensing
[3]. The WTO describes the Paragraph 6 decision as
removing the "final patent obstacle to cheap drug
imports."[4]
With one-third of the world's population still lacking
access to essential medicines, a figure rising to over 50%
in Asia and Africa, [5] for the public health community
the problems are two-fold. The first is the capacity of
LMICs to actually implement the flexibilities afforded
under TRIPs, the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 deci-
sion amid stark inequalities in health resources and the
world trading system as a whole. These include provisions
for compulsory licensing, parallel importing and address-
ing imbalances in research and development (R&D). The
pending ratification of the Paragraph 6 decision, from an
interim solution to permanent amendment, is accompa-
nied by much uncertainty – will the protections be acces-
sible under the currently proposed system? The second are
concerns about the undermining of the above hard won
flexibilities by provisions being adopted under various
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Known as "TRIPS
plus" or "WTO plus" measures, the standard of IPRs being
negotiated and even adopted under other trade agree-
ments are more restrictive of public health protections.
These two sources of concern have led to increased, rather
than lessening, tensions between the public health and
trade policy communities.
This paper begins by briefly reviewing progress to date on
the public health protections available under the TRIPS
agreement. It describes how, despite these important clar-
ifications, there remain concerns about the capacity of
LMICs to implement specific measures. The paper then
considers the further threat posed by TRIPS-plus measures
and calls for their critical assessment. Central to debates
about implementation and TRIPS-plus is an understand-
ing of fundamental imbalances in power and influence,
both within and across countries, defining what interests
can and cannot influence trade policy decisions. The
paper concludes by reviewing potential ways forward to
ensure that access to medicines by the poor is secured
within all trade agreements.
TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision: 
When public health protection takes primacy over trade
The TRIPS agreement came into effect in January 1995,
alongside the creation of the WTO, to facilitate trade
through the creation of a comprehensive multilateral
agreement on IPRs including patents, trademarks and
copyright. Prior to its implementation, IPR protection was
unevenly recognised in many countries. On patents,
TRIPS extended minimum standards of protection for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology without discrimination, subject to the normal
tests of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability
[6]. This includes the requirement by all WTO members to
make patents available for pharmaceutical innovations.
Alongside the conferment of patent rights for a period of
twenty years from the filing date, TRIPS establishes proce-
dures and remedies for patent holders to enforce their
rights.
In principle, TRIPS is intended to create a "level playing
field" of mutually recognised IPRs among all member
states, encouraging trade and, in turn, economic growth.
From its inception, however, the agreement has been the
subject of intense controversy, focused on how its provi-
sions affect the ability of the world's poor to access afford-
able medicines [7,8]. Before 1995, LMICs engaged in a
robust trade in generic and recently marketed drugs pro-
duced in countries where patent rights were unrecognised.
For the importing country, this trade was a source of
cheaper medicines, especially critical to countries under
severe resource constraints facing major public health
problems such as HIV/AIDS. Compliance with TRIPS
since 1995 has required WTO member states to restrict
such trade, and to grant to patent holders exclusive rights
to produce and sell protected drugs [9,10]. For public
health proponents, TRIPS enhanced the interests of tran-
snational pharmaceutical companies and industrialised
countries with large pharmaceutical industries, notably
the US, Japan and European Union, at the expense of
access to affordable medicines by millions in genuine
need.
Attempts to settle the concerns around public health pro-
tections led to the Doha Declaration in 2001, followed byGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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the Implementation of the Paragraph 6 Decision in 2003.
Combined, the two declarations provide clarifications on
the need for, and provisions available, to access generic
medicines. One of the most important results was a
waiver of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS agreement which
states that a compulsory license can only be issued for pri-
marily domestic use. This paragraph precluded generic
drug production for export to countries without their own
domestic capabilities, leaving the poorest countries with-
out access to generic medicines. The waiver allowed a
country to issue a compulsory license for either domestic
use or export, on the basis of public health need [11].
The Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision were ini-
tially hailed as a triumph by public health advocates [12].
The agreements appeared to distinguish drugs from other
traded commodities, and to secure the right of WTO
member states to uphold flexibilities contained within the
TRIPS agreement for the purpose of protecting public
health. Evidence of the positive impact of the agreements
was a decline in complaints against countries for inade-
quate IPR protection, registered by the US Trade Repre-
sentative, from five in 1999 to one in 2002 [13].
Implementing the Doha Declaration in a world of 
inequality
Despite the affirmations provided by the Doha Declara-
tion and Paragraph 6 decision, there remain a number of
difficulties for LMICs seeking to implement them in prac-
tice.
Compliance with TRIPS by LMICs and least developed countries
While the Doha Declaration extends the transition period
for compliance with the TRIPS agreement by least devel-
oped countries (LDCs) to 2016, it does not affect the orig-
inal timeline of 2005 for compliance by other LMICs. The
distinction between LDCs and other LMICs can be mis-
leading. LDCs is a designation created by the United
Nations to determine which countries are in greatest need
of aid. The list of around fifty countries is reviewed every
three years by the Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc)
according to criteria such as low income, weak human
resources and low level of economic diversification [14].
However, many LMICs such as Kenya and Nigeria not offi-
cially classified as LDCs remain very poor, and aggregate
national data obscures health needs among poor popula-
tions within them.
The 2005 date of compliance for most LMICs includes
countries that are major suppliers of generic drugs such as
India, Brazil and China. India is the fourth largest pro-
ducer of prescription drugs by volume, supplying 22% of
the world's generics and a significant proportion of vac-
cines to the developing world [15]. Major producers in
India include Ranbaxy with US$1.2 billion sales in 2005,
76% earned from overseas markets [16,17]. China had
over 4000 pharmaceutical factories in 2003, and is a
world leader in producing active pharmaceutical ingredi-
ents (API) for first line ARVs, as well as producing many
second line ARVs [15]. Brazil's generic industry, com-
prised of 37 national and 12 foreign companies, is also
rapidly growing, spurred by both domestic demand and
export potential [18]. Since 2005, unauthorised produc-
tion and sale of generic versions of drugs under patent by
most LMICs has not been permitted. While most drugs on
WHO's essential drug list were patented before 1995, and
therefore unaffected by the new measures, stronger IPR
protection affect the patent status of new and future drugs.
Restricting the production of generic drugs in compliance
with TRIPS also reduces competition, again increasing
prices and reducing affordability [19]. The cost of ARVs
are the most frequently cited, with generic versions of sec-
ond line treatments costing as little as US$140 per year
(compared with US$30 000 for patented versions) [20].
However, a range of other treatments are facing higher
prices. For instance, generic versions of the drug Gleevac®
(iminatib mesylate), a life-saving treatment for chronic
myeloid leukaemia, has reduced the price from US$2000
to US$200 per month [21]. A legal challenge by Novartis,
of the Indian Patent Office's denial of a patent for the
drug, given India's compliance with TRIPS in 2005,
brought protests by patient advocacy groups and NGOs
[22].
Compulsory licensing and parallel importing
While the Doha Declaration clarifies the right of LMICs to
engage in compulsory licensing and parallel importing,
there remains much trepidation about its use in practice.
Countries reliant on trade with powerful trading partners
have remained reluctant to exercise available flexibilities
for fear of incurring their wrath in other trade areas. Bra-
zil's efforts to freely provide ARVs are an often cited exam-
ple of how the declaration has strengthened the position
of LMICs. The Brazilian policy, announced in 1996, was
made possible by the production and import of generic
first-line and second-line treatments [23]. With Brazilian
compliance to TRIPS in 2005, the latter was no longer per-
mitted and the cost of second-line became problematic.
Threatening to introduce compulsory licensing, as permit-
ted under the Doha Declaration, the Brazilian govern-
ment pressured Abbott, Merck and Roche (manufacturers
of lopinavir, indinavir, nelfinavir and saquinavir respec-
tively) to substantially reduce prices, thus enabling more
than 100,000 people to receive free treatment [24]. In this
case, while the threat of compulsory licensing yielded
concessions by pharmaceutical companies, the flexibili-
ties remained untested in practice.
It was not until 2005 that the first country issued a com-
pulsory license under the waiver on the grounds of pro-Globalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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tecting public health. As countries have scrambled to
stockpile the anti-viral drug Tamiflu® (oseltamivir), amid
fears of a potential influenza pandemic, international
pressure was exerted on the patent holder Roche to issue
voluntary licenses to permit manufacture by other compa-
nies. As a country potentially among those most immedi-
ately affected by a pandemic, Taiwan decided to use the
flexibilities affirmed by the Doha Declaration to secure
access to Tamiflu®. Yet in doing so, the government con-
ceded provisos which suggested caution on its part.
Despite a clear public health rationale for the action, the
Taiwanese government remained concerned to minimise
potential damage to its image as a trading economy. For
example, manufacture would be for domestic purposes
only, limited to the end of 2007 and subject to "appropri-
ate" license fees to Roche. Moreover, Taiwan would use up
all Roche supplied drugs before using locally produced
supplies, and the compulsory license could be revoked
once agreement on a voluntary license was reached. As
stated by the Tipo deputy director-general, "Under these
circumstances, the Department of Health will not need to
use Tamiflu® from sources other than Roche unless a pan-
demic hits early next year and stockpiles are used up
quickly." [25]
The most notable action to date, to assert the waiver of
Article 31(f), has been by the Thai government which
authorised the Government Pharmaceutical Organisation
in November 2006 to manufacture generic versions of efa-
virenz (Stocrin®) until 2011, and to import generic ver-
sions from India until domestic production comes into
line [26,27]. While the manufacturer Merck conceded that
the action was in compliance with TRIPS, the company
claimed the government did not engage in sufficient con-
sultation to allow, for example, negotiation on a possible
reduced price for the drug. The US government also ques-
tioned the validity of the license, and pressed Thailand to
rescind the decision and negotiate with Merck. Unwaver-
ing, Thailand took a step further in January 2007, issuing
two further compulsory licenses for Kaletra®, patented by
Abbott, and Plavix®  patented by Sanofi-Aventis. These
actions are seen as the most serious attempt to date to
override patents [28]. Abbott initially responded by with-
holding a number of new medications from the Thai mar-
ket including the heat stable form of Kaletra®. The
company has since offered the medicine to Thailand and
39 other countries for US$1000 per patient per year,
although it continues to withhold other medications.
The experiences to date suggest that there remains general
reluctance among LMICs to fully test the flexibilities for
compulsory licensing available under TRIPS. In an
increasingly global economy, maintaining one's standing
as a trading partner committed to IPR protection has so far
taken precedence over access to medicines. The strong
reaction to the Thai government's action by the US and
transnational pharmaceutical industry reflects the degree
of pressure on countries to resist the use of TRIPS flexibil-
ities.
Data exclusivity and regulatory approval
Data exclusivity refers to the keeping confidential by drug
regulatory authorities of data on the safety and efficacy of
a new medicine for a set period. This data would be espe-
cially useful to generic producers which need only dem-
onstrate through such data that their product is
therapeutically equivalent to the original (bio-equiva-
lency). Without access to registered data, generic produc-
ers must either wait the given time period or replicate the
studies themselves. In principle, the market power of data
exclusivity is less restrictive than patents since it does not
prevent companies from creating their own data. In prac-
tice, access to such data substantially reduces time,
expense, and effort needed for registering new drugs [29].
Increasing the requirements around data exclusivity, in
short, effectively provides the data holder monopoly sta-
tus during which time it can market its product without
competition from generic products.
The extension of patent rights
Under Article 33 of TRIPS, "the term of protection shall
not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years"
from the filing date. This is the period during which the
product can be marketed with exclusive patent rights.
However, the length of the protection period can be a
reduced by two administrative procedures – the patent
examination process and marketing approval process. To
avoid "unwarranted curtailment" of the protection
period, the TRIPS agreement states that a patent should be
granted within a "reasonable period of time" (Article
62(2)). Prior to compliance with TRIPS, unwarranted cur-
tailment was not an issue given that US law granted the
period of protection from the date the patent is granted.
Following compliance with TRIPS, the US Patent Term
Guarantee Act was adopted in 1999 which permits the
protection period to be extended if a patent is not granted
within three years.
The research and development gap
Neither the Doha Declaration nor Paragraph 6 decision
address the fundamental issue of underinvestment in
R&D for health conditions that predominantly impact
LMICs. Between 1975 and 1997, 1,223 new chemicals
were launched on the market. Of the 31% which were
therapeutic innovations, only 1% was helpful for tropical
diseases [30]. R&D remains heavily concentrated in a
small number of large pharmaceutical companies located
in high-income countries seeking to serve those markets
[31]. For example, there are more drugs in the pipeline for
brain tumours than for tuberculosis which is one of topGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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killers globally and especially in the developing world
[32,33]. As profit-making commercial concerns, these
companies focus on markets which promise the greatest
economic return. Currently, 90% of research funds go to
only 10% of the world's disease burden [49]. For most
LMICs, lack of domestic R&D capacity and purchasing
power means a lack of drug development to meet signifi-
cant health needs.
Need for National Laws
The lack of appropriate legislation in many LMICs to
enshrine the protections under the TRIPS agreement,
Doha Declaration and IDDT remains a key challenge.
National legislation is essential because many provisions
are permitted only if written into law. Currently, many
LDCs have stricter IPR protection than is minimally
required by TRIPS [20]. Of thirty African LDCs, only two
do not grant patents for pharmaceuticals [34]. Further-
more, LMICs can only assert available flexibilities and
enhance their purchasing power if appropriate national
drug policies are in place, backed by a legislative frame-
work concerning such issues as use of generics, drug pric-
ing and taxation.
In this context, the key priorities for strengthening
national legislation in LMICs should include provisions
for compulsory licensing for both import and export, def-
inition of international exhaustion of rights and parallel
importing, early working policies and, for LDCs, how to
best use the available transitional period for compliance.
The option to use compulsory licensing, in particular, is
being hindered by complex legal and administrative bar-
riers including a failure to write compulsory licensing into
law. For example, Panama has no national legislative pro-
vision for issuing a compulsory license, while Honduras
does not include compulsory licensing as a remedy for
anti-competitive practices or unfair competition [35]. To
remedy this, countries must outline strong government
provisions with comprehensive and full entitlements pro-
vided under TRIPS, including authorization for patents
for public, non-commercial use and fast-track authoriza-
tion without long negotiations [36]. This requires clear
and straightforward procedures that do not suspend exe-
cution of a compulsory license if appealed against. This
would include writing into legislation the onus for proof
of patent infringement on the patent holder [37]. Equally
critical is for countries with  manufacturing capabilities,
which have been compliant with TRIPS since 2005, to
establish legislative and administrative frameworks for
allowing compulsory licensing for export purposes. These
countries include India, China, Brazil, Canada, South
Africa and Singapore [38,23].
Divide and conquer: The undermining of public health 
protections through bilateral and regional trade 
agreements
Along with the above barriers to implementing TRIPS flex-
ibilities, there is substantial concern among public health
advocates about the spread of so-called "TRIPS-plus"
measures. As efforts to progress trade liberalisation
through multilateral channels have stalled since 2003,
major industrialised countries have pursued negotiations
for bilateral and regional trade agreements outside of the
WTO. Seeking to fuel economic growth through trade,
governments of LMICs have agreed to such measures in
exchange for access to potentially lucrative export markets
for key sectors such as agriculture and textiles. For the
public health community, however, provisions to protect
access to medicines have been bargained away in a
number of ways.
First, the scope for compulsory licensing and parallel
importing has been a particular focus of TRIPS-plus
restrictions, narrowing the circumstances when parties are
permitted to use these measures. Under negotiations for a
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), for exam-
ple, it is proposed that compulsory licensing would only
be permitted when the patent on a product has expired or
in situations of "national emergency", with a body to be
set up over and above the WTO to rule on disputes [39].
Grounds permitted under agreements between the US and
Australia, Jordan and Singapore are limited to anticom-
petitive practices, public non-commercial use, national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency
[40]. Under the US-Australia FTA, drugs produced under
compulsory license in Australia are excluded from parallel
importation, even to alleviate a public health crisis in a
neighbouring country [41,42]. Similar measures have
been agreed between the US and Morocco, and US and
Singapore [43], and are being discussed in US negotia-
tions with dozens of additional countries. The same con-
cerns arise under trade agreements negotiated by EFTA
[44] and the European Union with the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU), Chile, Morocco, Mexico, the Pal-
estinian Authority and Jordan [45,46].
Second, TRIPS-plus measures increase provisions con-
cerning data exclusivity, enabling large pharmaceutical
companies to prevent or delay generic competition. While
TRIPS already provides for protection of such data, many
bilateral and regional agreements extend both the scope
and length of such protections. For example, the US-Aus-
tralia FTA includes a five-year protection period for
"undisclosed" pharmaceutical test data. The period
among EU member states is even longer at eight to ten
years [47]. Other restrictions negotiated include extending
the protection of data disclosed through the grant market-
ing procedures (versus data undisclosed covered byGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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TRIPS), extending data protection past patent expiry to
offset time lost during marketing approval (US-Chile, US-
Jordan, Central American FTA), and/or prohibiting reli-
ance on prior test data of both patented and off-patent
products by market approval authorities. These stronger
protections raise concerns because they reduce the capac-
ity of a country to issue or use compulsory licensing for
unpatented drugs. If required to await expiry of data exclu-
sivity, a country in effect is unable to make effective use of
a license [47]. According to Médicins sans Frontièrs, for
example, in Guatemala, generic manufacturers for most
ARVs need to wait fifteen years from the date of approval
of the original medicine in the country before obtaining
registration of their own version of the medicine. In Jor-
dan, an analysis of 103 medicines registered and launched
since the signing of the US-Jordan FTA in 2001, found at
least 79% have no generic competition as a consequence
of data exclusivity introduced under the agreement [48].
A related issue is that many bilateral and regional trade
agreements do not allow the so-called Bolar Provision.
This provision, also known as "early working", permits
the use of a patent protected invention or process and/or
data without authorization in order to facilitate regulatory
approval of a generic product before the patent expires.
This allows a generic product to enter the market more
quickly, speeding access to cheaper drugs. Under TRIPS-
plus measures, a patent owner must consent to marketing
approval for a generic version during the patent term.
Third, the period of patent protection has been extended
under TRIPS-plus measures. Bilateral agreements between
the US and Jordan, Chile, Australia, and proposals under
the FTAA, all effectively extend the period of patent pro-
tection [49]. A related form of patent extension is "ever-
greening," a term which refers to patent protection of
inventions, as opposed to medicines which may in fact have
multiple patents. "New use" for existing compounds, or a
change in the dose or form, can be the basis for applying
for an extension of the patent protection period, thus pre-
venting generic versions of the drug from being produced.
While not permitted under TRIPS, many FTAs include the
"new use" clauses. Even if an application for "new use"
does not succeed, the process of application can create
considerable delays, especially when applications become
embroiled in disputes over a potential patent violation
[46].
The available flexibilities under the TRIPS agreement to
protect public health, in short, face erosion by the negoti-
ation and agreement of TRIPS-plus measures. Major
industrialised countries, seeking to protect the interests of
transnational pharmaceutical companies, have pursued a
"divide and conquer" strategy. There is need to consider
how the public health community must act to prevent the
goal of access to medicines from being further under-
mined.
Reaffirming access to medicines as a global priority: What 
can be done?
The limited progress in improving access to medicines
through TRIPS, as affirmed by the Doha Declaration and
Paragraph 6 decision, points to the need for reassessment.
In February 2004, the WHO Director-General established
the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innova-
tion and Public Health to review the available evidence
and recommend ways forward to improve systems for
developing and accessing drugs in LMICs. The Commis-
sion considered access to medicines within a broader con-
text of industry structure and market incentives,
recognising that IPRs are only one means of stimulating
action. In its final report, the Commission made sixty rec-
ommendations organised into five categories: (a) the dis-
covery of new health-care products; (b) the development of
drugs from pre-clinical and clinical research, and the reg-
ulatory process; (c) the delivery of new and existing prod-
ucts to LMICs; (d) the fostering of innovation in the
developing world; and (e) the roles and responsibilities of
WHO in leading ways forward.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a
detailed assessment of all recommendations, options for
implementing the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6
decision, and the threats posed by bilateral and regional
trade agreements, need to be considered alongside them.
The limitations of the two agreements have become
apparent in efforts to adopt them as a permanent amend-
ment to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS agreement. Negotia-
tions on the amendment began in early 2004, with initial
hopes that they would be concluded within six months.
While the discussions have not formed part of the Doha
Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations,
the issue soon became subsumed as a bargaining chip, in
the run up to the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference of
2005, by powerful trading countries seeking concessions
on other issues, notably agricultural subsidies,. Efforts to
find a "permanent solution" to compulsory licensing at
the WTO TRIPS Council in October 2005 stumbled on the
realisation by a growing number of LMICs that the tabled
amendment was overly cumbersome (see Figure 1).
According to Médicins sans Frontières (MSF), they placed
a "burden on drug procurement [that] could discourage
rather than encourage generic production." [50] For
example, if a country wanted to issue a compulsory license
for efavirenz, tenofovir and lamivudine as a triple combi-
nation therapy for HIV/AIDS, this would require separate
applications for each medicine involving three different
manufacturers (Bristol-Myers Squibb, Gilead Sciences and
GlaxoSmithKline). Moreover, as the procedure is required
on a drug-by-drug and country-by-country basis, anyGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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economies of scale would be lost, potentially increasing
prices and decreasing incentives to exporters. African
countries, supported by other LMICs including Brazil and
India, unsuccessfully tabled a proposed amendment to
Article 31(f) that excluded such burdensome require-
ments. They also sought to exclude provisions set out in a
statement by the Chair of the General Council, Carlos
Pérez del Castillo, made on 30 August 2003 alongside the
Paragraph 6 decision [51]. The US, however, strongly
opposed the removal of the Chair's statement, consider-
ing it an integral part of the decision itself. Efforts by EU
member states to informally table a "middle ground"
approach failed to break this impasse and, after further
pressure on LMICs, the original amendment was put for-
ward for ratification. With a deadline of December 2007,
to date only three countries (US, Switzerland and El Salva-
dor) of the required two-thirds of WTO members have rat-
ified the amendment. The requisite one hundred
countries needed for formal ratification is unlikely to be
reached given calls for a boycott on further ratification by
LMICs and NGOs.
The legal status of the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6
decision after 2007, therefore, remains uncertain, along
with how its measures can be used to improve access to
medicines. The report of the WHO Commission recom-
mends a broad range of policy changes needed to improve
all stages of drug production and use. For example, it calls
on industrialised countries to allocate more resources to
R&D on the health needs of LMICs, create ways of better
sharing information, strengthen health delivery systems,
and promote public-private partnerships. In relation to
the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision specifi-
cally, the report calls for adaptations to national legisla-
tion and institutions to allow TRIPS flexibilities to be
used, for public health justifications to be used when
requiring data protection rules, and for the Paragraph 6
decision "to be kept under review and appropriate
changes considered to achieve a workable solution, if nec-
essary."[52]
While this paper supports the above recommendations,
there is also a need to address the broader context of ine-
qualities in power and influence within the global econ-
omy. The access to medicines issue mirrors the existing
world trading system, formally governed by the WTO's
149 member states but, in practice, a product of stark ine-
qualities within and across countries. Foremost is the
need to recognise the powerful vested interests behind the
globalization of IPRs, both government and corporate,
often working collaboratively to further shared objectives.
Drahos and Braithwaite describe TRIPS itself as the prod-
uct of a corporate agenda, with its negotiation process
highly skewed in favour of such interests [53]. While the
Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision were hard
won agreements by public health advocates, Faunce asks
to what extent the agreements are genuine commitments
to improving access to medicines, or vaguely worded doc-
uments designed all along to give little away? [54]
Given the power and influence of the vested interests con-
cerned, how can the public health community move for-
ward to secure access to medicines? First, the current
amendment to the TRIPS agreement should not be
adopted. Instead, negotiations for simplified procedures
under the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision,
which enable the practical implementation of their meas-
ures, need to be initiated. The implications of the cur-
rently proposed amendment are still yet not fully
understood, but the lack of compulsory licensing since
2003 is very concerning for LMICs. The action by the Thai
government should be watched closely in this respect,
along with consideration of how procedures impact LDCs
with considerably less capacity and greater dependence on
drug imports.
Second, LMICs with substantial pharmaceutical markets,
such as India, Brazil and Thailand, can provide leadership
and establish importance precedence by asserting the flex-
ibilities available under TRIPS to protect public health.
Countries with established generic manufacturing capac-
ity, such as India and China, should protect access by
adopting TRIPS flexibilities into national patent laws. For
example, Chile took proactive steps to protect access to
medicines from data exclusivity provisions even in the
wake of signing its FTA with the US.
Third, and relatedly, LMICs and public health advocates
can work collectively to resist pressures to dilute public
health protections. In bilateral and regional trade negoti-
ations, individual countries are especially vulnerable to
the negotiating power of major trading nations. Joint
efforts and combined forces are critical to the power
imbalances inherent in trade negotiations. In May 2006,
ten countries issued the Declaration of Ministers of South
America over Intellectual Property, Access to Medicines,
and Public Health. The declaration establishes a united
position against the further spread of TRIPS-plus meas-
ures. The case of Rwanda suggests that even relatively
small countries can cite public health need to negotiate
better deals. As a recipient of PEPFAR funding, the country
received US$ millions with the proviso that drugs
approved by the US Federal Drug Administration (FDA),
almost all brand named and manufactured by US-based
companies, must be purchased. Recognising the higher
cost of this proviso, the Rwandan government passed a
law requiring the purchase of generic drugs when availa-
ble for any and all treatment programs. The US yielded
through an elaborate collaboration with other donors,
and Rwanda was thus able to reduce the cost of drugs pur-Globalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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chased and increase the number of patients treated [55].
Rwanda's ARV requirement was pooled, and the US
became responsible for purchasing the brand name drugs
required, while other funds went towards generic pur-
chase. The drugs were then appropriately distributed to
each site.
Fourth, "South-South" partnerships could be used to mit-
igate resource constraints, weaknesses in capacity and
market failures. LMICs with established pharmaceutical
industries could lead efforts in innovation and technology
transfer [56]. An example is the Technological Network on
AIDS, an initiative by Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba,
Nigeria, Russia, Ukraine and Thailand, to promote tech-
nology transfer [57]. Pooled procurement among LMICs,
advocated by WHO, can also be effective for negotiating
lower prices by combining markets and improving econ-
omies of scale. One example is the Organization of East-
ern Caribbean States (OECS), representing nine
Caribbean countries, which successfully reduced drug
Requirements under tabled amendment to Paragraph 31(f) of TRIPS Figure 1
Requirements under tabled amendment to Paragraph 31(f) of TRIPS.
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prices in the 1980s by about 44% compared to the origi-
nal prices in the individual countries.
Fiftth, public health protections should be recognised as a
starting point within all trade agreements, whether nego-
tiated at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels, and
should be set aside from high-level "horse trading" that
routinely takes place between negotiating parties. LMICs
are not the only countries that would benefit from the
protection of public health under TRIPS. The issue of
access to medicines to meet critical public health needs
arose during the deliberate spread of anthrax in the US by
unknown parties in 2001. A potential shortage of the anti-
biotic Cipro® (ciprofloxacin) prompted calls for the man-
ufacturer Bayer to agree a voluntary license. After intense
negotiations, the US and Canada reached agreement in
October 2001 for Bayer to supply increased amounts of
the drug at a "substantially lowered price" [58]. The agree-
ment correctly took the chance that a major terrorist attack
would not occur immediately and stockpiles could be
built up over several years. Since 2003, similar concerns
have been expressed over the need to stockpile anti-viral
drugs in the event of an influenza pandemic. Once again
a worldwide shortage of a patented medicine, in this case
of oseltamivir phosphate (Tamiflu®), prompted debates
about the importance of protecting IPRs versus protecting
public health. While the use of compulsory licensing was
avoided in both cases, they demonstrated that LMICs are
not alone in their vulnerability to major public health
threats. In the wake of the anthrax scare, the US govern-
ment expressed its commitment to public health on a
number of occasions, [59] including references to the
Doha Declaration as one of four principal negotiating
objectives for IPRs in the 2002 Trade Promotion Authori-
zation Act. This act authorises the President to send signed
trade agreements to Congress for consideration under
expedited procedure [60]. In practice, the US trade repre-
sentative has ignored the Doha Declaration in bilateral
trade negotiations, instead leading the push for the glo-
balization of more stringent IPRs [61-63]. The enhanced
capacity of diseases to spread across borders as a result of
globalization means that undermining the capacity of
LMICs, in this way, may prove short sighted. While poor
countries are clearly more vulnerable than others to pub-
lic health threats, no country remains out of reach in a
world of increasing globalization.
Finally, the role of the pharmaceutical industry is critical
to this debate given its vital role in discovering and devel-
oping effective drugs. It remains among the Fortune 500's
most profitable business sectors, [64,65] although it has
not proven immune to setbacks. The expiration of patent
rights on high profit products, intense competition from
generics, failure to develop a new generation of "block-
buster" drugs, and public criticism have all cast shadows
on the industry. The clear tensions between profit making
and public interest are not easily resolved. The market
alone will not resolve the problem of access to medicines
by the world's poor. For pharmaceutical companies seek-
ing world markets, the globalization of IPRs are seen as
essential for recouping investment to develop and market
new drugs, estimated (and disputed by some groups [66])
at US$802 million per drug [67]. Moreover, access to
medicines is seen by many industry representatives as a
problem arising from improper prescribing, irrational use
and selection, poor distribution chains, and unsustaina-
ble financing [68].
The problem of access to medicines in LMICs is indeed
linked to wider development needs, and undoubtedly
may become less pressing as economic and social progress
is achieved. However, as argued by the WHO Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health, good health is an essen-
tial ingredient to poverty reduction and socioeconomic
development [69]. Fighting disease is vital to economic
success. The collective neglect of public health needs in
LMICs maintains the vicious cycle of poor health and
underdevelopment. Finding ways of improving access,
correspondingly, can contribute to an upward spiral of
better health and more rapid development. For pharma-
ceutical companies, the creation of new markets in LMICs
may offer longer term sustainability and growth. It is esti-
mated by the Global Alliance for TB Drug Development,
for example, that the market for anti-TB drugs will grow,
from around US$412–470 million in 2006 to US$612–
670 million by 2010 [70].
Conclusion
While the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision
affirm important principles under the TRIPS agreement,
regarding the protection of public health within interna-
tional trade law, key challenges remain. The lack of
progress in implementing TRIPS flexibilities to improve
access to medicines, and the spread of TRIPS-plus meas-
ures through bilateral and regional trade agreements,
require concerted attention. LMICs dependent on access
to export markets in industrialised countries have been
pressured to prioritise trade over public health protec-
tions. Powerful trading nations, acting on behalf of tran-
snational pharmaceutical companies, have benefited
from a "divide and conquer" strategy [71].
The challenge of improving access to medicines for LMICs
thus stands at a critical crossroad. One choice is for the
global community to allow the Doha Declaration to
become a pawn in the high politics of trade policy, tram-
pled by the spread of TRIPS-plus measures designed to
push access to medicines by the poor even further out of
reach. The other choice is to stand true to the public health
protections available within the TRIPS agreement. ThisGlobalization and Health 2007, 3:3 http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/3
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would mean an affirmation of those principles, setting
them apart and above trade negotiations, accompanied by
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